Following are some of our publications in moral psychology since the group’s inception in 2003.

Doris, J. M., Harman, G., Nichols, S., Prinz, J., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Stich, S. (co-authors/editors). forthcoming. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Doris, J. M., & Nichols, S., forthcoming. “Broadminded: Sociality and the Cognitive Science of Morality.” In E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Doris, J. M., Knobe, J., & Woolfolk, R. forthcoming. “Variantism about Responsibility.” Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Mind

Doris, J. M., & Murphy, D. (co-authors) 2007. “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of Atrocity.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 25-50

Doris, J. M., and Plakias, A. (co-authors) 2007. “How to Argue about Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism.” In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Doris, J. M. 2006. “Out of Character: On the Psychology of Excuses in the Criminal Law.” In H. La Follette (ed.), Ethics in Practice (3rd edn.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

Doris, J. M. 2005. “Précis” and “Replies: Evidence and Sensibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 632-5, 656-77

Doris, J. M., and Stich, S. P. 2006. “Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Doris, J. M., & Stich, S. P. 2005. “As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics.” In F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Doris, J. M., & Stich, S. P. 2004. “Ethics and Psychology.” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online

Greene, J. D. forthcoming. “Social Neuroscience and the Soul’s Last Stand.” In A. Todorov, S. Fiske, & D. Prentice (eds.), Social Neuroscience: Toward Understanding the Underpinnings of the Social Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Greene, J. D. forthcoming. “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Greene, J.D. 2007. “Why Are VMPFC Patients More Utilitarian?: A Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgment Explains.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11: 322-323.

Greene, J. D. 2005. “Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind.” In S. Laurence, P. Carruthers,. and S. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press.

Greene, J. D. 2005. “Emotion and Cognition in Moral Judgment: Evidence from Neuroimaging” In J.P. Changeux, A.R. Damasio, W. Singer, & Y. Christen (eds.) Neurobiology of Human Values. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Greene, J. D. , & Cohen J. D. 2004. “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B (Special Issue on Law and the Brain) 359: 1775-1785.

Greene, J.D., Nystrom, L.E., Engell, A.D., Darley, J.M., & Cohen, J.D. 2004. “The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment.” Neuron 44: 389-400.

Greene, J.D. 2003. “From Neural ‘is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4: 847-850.

Harman, G. 2006. “Intending, Intention, Intent, Intentional Action, and Acting Intentionally: Comments on Knobe and Burra.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:
269-75.

Harman, G. 2005. “Moral Particularism and Transduction.” Philosophical Issues 15:
44-55.

Harman, G. 2004. “Practical Aspects of Theoretical Rationality,” In A. Mele & P. Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. pp. 45-56.

Harman, G. 2003. “Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 37: 415-25.

Hulse, D., Read, C. N., and Schroeder, T. 2004. “The Impossibility of Conscious Desire.” American Philosophical Quarterly 41: 73-80
Kelly, D., Machery, E., & Mallon, R. fortcoming. “Racial Cognition and Normative Theory.” In J. M. Doris et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knobe, J. forthcoming. “What is Experimental Philosophy.” The Philosophers’ Magazine.

Knobe, J. forthcoming “Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance.” Philosophical Explorations.

Knobe, J. forthcoming. “Folk Psychology: Science and Morals.” In Hutto, D. & Ratcliffe, M. (eds.) Folk Psychology Reassessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.

Knobe, J. 2006. “The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology.” Philosophical Studies 130: 203-231

Knobe, J. 2005a. “Cognitive Processes Shaped By the Impulse to Blame.” Brooklyn Law Review 71: 929-937.
Knobe, J. 2005b. “Theory of Mind and Moral Cognition: Exploring the Connections.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9: 357-359

Knobe, J. 2004a “Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Considerations.” Analysis 64: 181-187

Knobe, J. 2004b “Folk Psychology and Folk Morality: Response to Critics.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24

Knobe, J. 2003a. “Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190-193

Knobe, J. 2003b “Intentional Action in Folk Psychhology: An Experimental Investigation.” Philosophical Psychology 16: 309-324

Knobe, J. and Burra, A. 2006a. “Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study.” Journal of Culture and Cognition 6: 113-132

Knobe, J. and Burra, A. 2006b. “Experimental Philosophy and Folk Concepts: Methodological Considerations.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 6: 331-342

Knobe, J. & Fraser, B. forthcoming. “Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology. Cambride: MIT Press

Knobe, J. & Mendlow, G. 2004. “The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 252-258

Knobe, J. & Roedder, E. 2006. “The Concept of Valuing: Empirical Studies.” Online Philosophy Conference.
Leslie, A., Knobe, J. & Cohen, A. 2006. “Acting Intentionally and the Side-effect Effect” ‘Theory of Mind’ and Moral Judgment.” Psychological Science 17 421-427

Machery, E. forthcoming. “The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and
Experimental Issues.” Mind & Language.

Machery, E., & Faucher, L. 2005. “Social Construction and the Concept of
Race.” Philosophy of Science: 1208-1219.

Machery, E., & Faucher, L. 2005. “Why do we Think Racially?.” In H. Cohen and
C. Lefebvre (eds.), Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science. Elsevier. pp. 1009-1033

Machery, E., Kelly, D., & Stich, S. P. 2005. “Moral Realism and
Cross-Cultural Normative Diversity: Comment on Henrich et al.” Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 28: 830

McClure, S.M., Botvinick, M.M., Yeung, N., Greene, J.D., & Cohen, J.D. 2007. “Conflict Monitoring in Conflict-emotion Competition.” In J.J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation. New York: Guilford Press

Merritt, M. 2008. “Aristotelean Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of Ethical Character.” Journal of Moral Philosophy

Merritt, M. “Other-Oriented Attention and Meta-Cognitive Awareness.” In C. Upton (ed.), Virtue Ethics and the Challenge of Situationism

Nichols, S. forthcoming. “After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes.” Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Mind

Nichols, S. forthcoming. “How Can Psychology Contribute to the Free Will Debate?” In J. Baer, J. Kaufman, & R. Baumeister (eds.), Psychology and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press

Nichols, S. 2008. “Moral Rationalism and Empirical Immunity.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Nichols, S. 2008. “Sentiment, Intention, and Disagreement: Replies to Blair & D’Arms.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Nichols, S. 2008. “Sentimentalism Naturalized.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Nichols, S. 2007. “On the Psychological Diversity of Moral Insensitivity.” In O. Vilarroya and L. Valencia (eds.), Biology of Conflicts and Cooperation. Barcelona: Littera Ediciones

Nichols, S. 2007. “The Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the
Quantitative History of Philosophy.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXXI. Pp. 260-270

Nichols, S. 2006. “Folk Intuitions about Free Will.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 6

Nichols, S. 2006. “Free Will and the Folk: Responses to Commentators.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 6

Nichols, S. 2005. “Innateness and Moral Psychology.” In. P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 353-369

Nichols, S. 2004. “After Objectivity: An Empirical Study of Moral
Judgment.” Philosophical Psychology 17: 5-28

Nichols, S. 2004. “The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts.” Mind & Language 19: 473-502

Nichols, S. 2004. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press

Nichols, S. and Folds-Bennett, T. 2003. “Are Children Moral Objectivists? Children’s Judgments about Moral and Response-Dependent Properties.” Cognition 90: B23-B32

Nichols, S. and Mallon, R. 2006. “Moral Dilemmas and Moral Rules.” Cognition 100: 530-542

Nichols, S. and Ulatowski, J. 2007. “Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited.” Mind & Language 22: 346-365

Plakias, A., and Doris J. M. (co-authors) 2007. “How to Find a Disagreement: Philosophical Diversity and Moral Realism.” In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Schroeder, T. 2005. “Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome.”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71: 106-23
Schroeder, T. 2004. Three Faces of Desire. New York: Oxford University
Press

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. forthcoming. “Abstract + Concretre = Paradox.” In S. Nichols and J. Knobe (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. forthcoming. “Is Moral Phenomenology Unified?” Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. forthcoming. “Intention, Temporal Order, and Moral Judgments.” (with Ron Mallon, Jay Hull, and Tom McCoy) Mind and Language

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. (ed.) 2008. Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: MIT Press

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. (ed.) 2008. Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge: MIT Press

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. (ed.) 2008. Moral Psychology, Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality. Cambridge: MIT Press

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. 2008. “Framing Moral Intuitions” In W. P. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.). Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 47-76.

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. 2008. “Reply to Tolhurst and Shafer-Landau.” In W. P. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.). Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 97-105

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. 2006. Moral Skepticisms. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 9

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. 2006. “Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.” In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 339-365

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. 2006. “Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral Judgments: An fMRI Investigation.” (with Jana Schaich Borg, Catherine Hynes, John van Horn, and Scott Grafton) Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18: 803-817

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. 2005. “You Ought to be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation).”, Philosophical Issues 15 (Normativity): 193-208

Sinnott-Armstrong. W. P. & Sosa, E. (eds.) 2008. Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy: Ethics, Philosophical Issues

Tiberius, V. forthcoming. The Reflective Life: Living Wisely with Our Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Tiberius, V. forthcoming. “The Nativism Debate and Moral Philosophy: Comments on Jesse Prinz, ‘Is Morality Innate?’” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology,
Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness. Cambridge: MIT Press

Tiberius, V. 2006. “Well-Being: Psychological Research for Philosophers” Philosophy
Compass: 493-505

Tiberius, V. 2004. “Cultural Differences and Philosophical Accounts of Well-Being.” Journal of Happiness Studies 5: 293-314.

Woolfolk, R. L, Doris, J. M., & Darley, J. M. 2006. “Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social Cognition: Studies in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility.” Cognition 100: 283-301